How Technology Reshaped Malawi's 2025 Election

 

 

Malawi's 2025 General Election offers a high-impact lesson for election managers: technology creates real value when it is treated as part of an institution's everyday operating capacity, not as a standalone innovation.

A Post-Election Review prepared for the Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC) with the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) found that integrated digital systems strengthened operational efficiency, data integrity and electoral service delivery across the electoral cycle. The review was commissioned by MEC and drew on stakeholder consultations across the country. MEC has also published an overview of the post-election review process here.

The review concludes: "The successful integration of digital systems demonstrated the Commission's growing institutional capacity to modernize electoral management while strengthening operational efficiency, data integrity and service delivery." (Post-Election Review, p. 77)

In 2025, digital tools moved beyond isolated use cases to become an integral part of electoral administration. That progress reflected MEC's ownership and operation of the technology, supported by the staff, procedures, communications and infrastructure required to make it work in a high-stakes national election.

In the review's words: "Technology was no longer deployed as a series of isolated innovations but had become an integral component of electoral administration across multiple stages of the electoral cycle." (Post-Election Review, p. 77)

Technology across the electoral cycle

The deployment included 6,500 Election Management Devices (EMDs) and 15,200 Biometric Voter Verification Devices (BVVDs).

The EMDs supported voter registration and transfers, register verification, candidate nominations, and results management, reducing manual processes and improving the management of electoral data.

At polling stations, BVVDs supported voter identification and verification. The review records that approximately 85 percent of voters were biometrically verified on election day. Stakeholder feedback in the report associates biometric verification with stronger safeguards against impersonation and manipulation, and greater transparency in the voting process.

Stakeholders reported: "The BVVD increased transparency and public trust by preventing impersonation and manipulation." (Post-Election Review, p. 78)

These are important outcomes, but they should not be read as a claim that technology alone creates confidence. The lesson is more practical: technology strengthens confidence when it supports clear procedures, is used competently by election staff, and is understood by voters, political actors and observers.

Visibility at every stage of results processing

The review also highlights the results-management process, which digitized, transmitted and tabulated results from constituency tally centers to the national tally center. A digital results pipeline is not only a matter of speed; it makes the process more visible, traceable and manageable when results are under intense public scrutiny.

Stakeholder comments recorded in the review indicate that the speed and visibility of this digital process contributed to an orderly conclusion of results processing. That does not remove the need for transparent legal procedures, auditable records and clear public communication. Rather, it shows how well-integrated systems can reinforce those safeguards at a moment when trust matters most.

Analysts have since linked that same clarity to a broader democratic outcome: a decisive, quickly confirmed result allowed President Chakwera to concede early, which eased pressure on the judiciary and lowered the risk of post-election disputes (Chatham House).

The stakeholder feedback is explicit: "The speed and visibility of this digital pipeline contributed heavily to an undisputed, orderly conclusion of the results processing phase." (Post-Election Review, pp. 78-79)

Institutional capacity is the real enabler

Malawi's experience points to a broader principle for electoral authorities globally: the success of election technology depends on the institution around it.

The Post-Election Review notes that MEC was able to own and operate the technology directly, a result of effective training and knowledge transfer during deployment. Sustainable systems depend on this kind of institutional readiness: trained staff, documented processes, local operational knowledge, and contingency plans that work under pressure.

The review also identifies areas for continued improvement, including transparent technology governance, clearer legal and operational frameworks, comprehensive testing, hands-on training, proactive public communication and resilient arrangements for connectivity and power.

The review cautions: "Successful technology adoption depends not only on technical functionality but equally on stakeholder confidence in how technology is governed, managed and communicated." (Post-Election Review, p. 78)

Those recommendations are not an approval of technology per se. They are a roadmap for making it more reliable, understandable and trusted.

A lesson for future elections

The most useful takeaway from Malawi is not that any single device or platform is a solution in itself. It is that digital electoral systems are most effective when embedded in capable institutions and supported by rigorous planning.

Technology can improve efficiency, protect data integrity and enhance electoral service delivery. But its legitimacy ultimately rests on transparent governance, human capability and the confidence of the people it serves.

The review remains a consultative document reflecting stakeholder perspectives and observer evidence; it is not a final MEC reform program or an institutional endorsement by MEC, UNDP or any observer organization.

What the CIA’s Venezuela Memo Actually Says About Voting Machines

President Trump’s July 16 address promised long-awaited proof that foreign actors had manipulated the 2020 U.S. election. Among the declassified documents released alongside the speech was a CIA assessment examining nearly two decades of intelligence on Venezuela’s electronic voting system.

Rather than validating years of allegations about voting machines, the report reaches a far narrower conclusion.

The CIA found that Venezuelan officials had developed some capability to manipulate electronic voting systems domestically, but it also concluded that there was no evidence they had done so or that such technology had been used to carry out large-scale electronic fraud in Venezuelan elections. Most significantly, it states that neither Smartmatic, the technology provider, nor the Venezuelan government had the capability to manipulate the outcome of an election outside Venezuela.

That distinction between possessing a theoretical capability and demonstrating that it was actually used is the central finding of the report, and one that was initially overshadowed by the political narrative surrounding its release. Much of the subsequent media coverage, however, has examined the document critically, challenged the claims surrounding it, and clarified what the assessment does and does not establish.

The six-page assessment, which does not identify its author or disclose the sources allegedly relied upon in preparing it, reviews intelligence collected between 2004 and 2020, a period encompassing every Venezuelan national election conducted using electronic voting. Although it is an anonymously drafted document based on anonymous sources, it does not establish, even after examining nearly two decades of reporting, that electronic vote manipulation occurred. The report notes, however, that with respect to the 2020 National Assembly election, a source judged that the Maduro government did not need to resort to electronic fraud because the opposition had largely boycotted the vote and the regime had already neutralized much of its political competition.

This does not mean Venezuela’s elections were free or democratic. For decades, international observers, including the Carter Center, repeatedly documented serious shortcomings that undermined the integrity of the electoral process. Across multiple election cycles, they cited the misuse of state resources to benefit the incumbent, the overwhelming dominance of state media and unequal access to broadcast coverage, restrictions on opposition campaigning, and the use of government institutions to tilt the playing field. More recently, the Carter Center concluded that the 2024 presidential election failed to meet international standards of electoral integrity and that the electoral authority demonstrated a clear bias in favor of the incumbent. These criticisms point to an uneven electoral environment, not to evidence that electronic voting machines altered votes.

The assessment also revisits Smartmatic’s role in Venezuela. While the company has frequently been the subject of conspiracy theories, the CIA notes that Smartmatic ultimately broke with the Maduro government after publicly accusing it of inflating turnout by more than one million votes during the 2017 Constituent Assembly election and subsequently ended its operations in the country.

Perhaps the report’s clearest conclusion concerns allegations that Venezuelan voting technology was used to influence elections abroad. The CIA rejects that claim outright, concluding that neither Smartmatic nor the Venezuelan government possessed the capability to manipulate election outcomes outside Venezuela. That finding is consistent with conclusions reached by international election monitors, post-election audits, election security experts, and several U.S. courts.

The declassified memo does not paint a flattering picture of Venezuela’s electoral system. It describes an authoritarian government, political manipulation, and longstanding concerns about electoral integrity. But on the question that has fueled years of conspiracy theories, whether electronic voting machines were used to rig elections in Venezuela or abroad, the CIA’s own assessment does not deliver the evidence many expected. If anything, it points in the opposite direction.

Vote, Uninterrupted

Electricity isn’t something that immediately comes to mind during elections. Yet beneath ballots, voting machines, candidates lies something less visible but equally essential: infrastructure. Electricity powers polling stations, keeps electronic systems running, supports communications, and helps transmit results. When that foundation fails, the election itself is tested.

South Africa offers a powerful reminder. For years, the country has dealt with recurring electricity shortages and rolling blackouts, known locally as load shedding. In 2024, reports of disruptions in voting and counting have made citizens edgy. While the problem has since been largely solved, the Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) is leaving no stone unturned in ensuring  the highest readiness for the upcoming 2026 municipal elections.

The challenge extends far beyond South Africa. Power outages and infrastructure disruptions have affected elections in many places, and emergency guidance from election authorities in countries such as Canada and the United States treats major outages, floods, fires, and cyber incidents as realistic threats to voting operations. In other words, election resilience is not a niche concern; it is a basic requirement of modern administration.

The lesson is simple: elections should never depend on perfect conditions. Hospitals prepare for blackouts, data centers build redundancy, and aviation assumes systems can fail. Election management bodies should think the same way.  

Imagine every polling station asking one question during planning: what happens if the power fails at 11:30 in the morning? Can voting continue? Can voters still be identified? Can ballots still be issued? Can election records remain secure until communications are restored? If the answer to any of these is no, resilience has become a design problem, not just an operational one.

Fortunately, many solutions already exist. Battery backups can keep essential equipment running for hours. Solar-powered systems can support remote or off-grid locations. Emergency communications protocols can maintain contact when regular networks fail. Offline-first election software can keep operating without internet access and later synchronize securely when service returns.

Technology, however, is only part of the answer. The strongest contingency plans are often procedural. Poll workers should know how to switch to manual processes when systems fail. Clear chain-of-custody protocols should protect materials during outages. Redundant communications between field officials and election headquarters should already be in place. Most importantly, contingency plans should be tested under realistic conditions, not simply written down.

That these preparations rarely make headlines is precisely the point. The best contingency plan is the one voters never notice because the election continues almost seamlessly despite unexpected disruption.

As elections become more digital, resilience will matter more than ever. Citizens should never have to wonder whether they can vote because the lights went out.

Trump’s Venezuela Theory Revives a Core Contradiction of 2020

 

Photo: Donald Trump at Truth Social

 

Over the weekend, former President Donald Trump posted videos and statements promoting a claim that Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro was involved in fraud during the 2020 U.S. election, suggesting Venezuela helped tilt the outcome in favor of President Joe Biden. The claims surfaced amid renewed attention on Maduro following his capture and quickly circulated across social media.

Taken at face value, Trump’s assertions lead to a striking implication: if such fraud occurred, it would raise serious questions about the effectiveness of his own administration in safeguarding the U.S. electoral system.

In 2020, Trump was not an outsider challenging a system controlled by others. He was the sitting President of the United States, serving as commander in chief and overseeing the federal government, including intelligence agencies, the military, and entities responsible for protecting critical infrastructure. Election security fell squarely within that responsibility. If the system had been compromised at a national scale, the failure to prevent or detect it would rest largely with the administration in power.

Trump’s renewed focus on Venezuela deepens the contradiction. If Maduro, a leader who could not even sustain electoral manipulation in Venezuela without it being quickly exposed, were capable of covertly influencing a U.S. presidential election, it would suggest an extraordinary vulnerability in American election security that few experts consider plausible.

Some versions of these conspiracy theories go further, alleging that U.S. votes were transferred abroad for counting, including to countries such as Serbia. If true, such claims would point not just to interference, but to a breakdown in election oversight, cybersecurity, and interagency coordination at the federal level.

This framing leaves little middle ground. Either the claims are unfounded, or accepting them requires acknowledging a profound failure of governance under Trump’s presidency. It is difficult to reconcile allegations of massive, undetected interference with assertions of strong leadership and effective national security management.

Ultimately, Trump’s revived allegations resurface a contradiction that has followed his post-presidency narrative for years. The more expansive the alleged fraud, the greater the implied failure of the administration responsible for preventing it. In challenging the legitimacy of the 2020 election, Trump also invites renewed scrutiny of his own record in protecting the democratic institutions he once led.