Trump’s Venezuela Theory Revives a Core Contradiction of 2020

 

Photo: Donald Trump at Truth Social

 

Over the weekend, former President Donald Trump posted videos and statements promoting a claim that Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro was involved in fraud during the 2020 U.S. election, suggesting Venezuela helped tilt the outcome in favor of President Joe Biden. The claims surfaced amid renewed attention on Maduro following his capture and quickly circulated across social media.

Taken at face value, Trump’s assertions lead to a striking implication: if such fraud occurred, it would raise serious questions about the effectiveness of his own administration in safeguarding the U.S. electoral system.

In 2020, Trump was not an outsider challenging a system controlled by others. He was the sitting President of the United States, serving as commander in chief and overseeing the federal government, including intelligence agencies, the military, and entities responsible for protecting critical infrastructure. Election security fell squarely within that responsibility. If the system had been compromised at a national scale, the failure to prevent or detect it would rest largely with the administration in power.

Trump’s renewed focus on Venezuela deepens the contradiction. If Maduro, a leader who could not even sustain electoral manipulation in Venezuela without it being quickly exposed, were capable of covertly influencing a U.S. presidential election, it would suggest an extraordinary vulnerability in American election security that few experts consider plausible.

Some versions of these conspiracy theories go further, alleging that U.S. votes were transferred abroad for counting, including to countries such as Serbia. If true, such claims would point not just to interference, but to a breakdown in election oversight, cybersecurity, and interagency coordination at the federal level.

This framing leaves little middle ground. Either the claims are unfounded, or accepting them requires acknowledging a profound failure of governance under Trump’s presidency. It is difficult to reconcile allegations of massive, undetected interference with assertions of strong leadership and effective national security management.

Ultimately, Trump’s revived allegations resurface a contradiction that has followed his post-presidency narrative for years. The more expansive the alleged fraud, the greater the implied failure of the administration responsible for preventing it. In challenging the legitimacy of the 2020 election, Trump also invites renewed scrutiny of his own record in protecting the democratic institutions he once led.

Anatomy of election fraud: How manual counting abetted poll-rigging in Belarus

 

Kommersant Photo / Polaris/Newscom

In a massive outpouring of indignation, hundreds of thousands of protesters have occupied the streets of Belarus demanding the resignation of President Alexander Lukashenko, who was recently elected for a sixth term in an election tainted by allegations of rigging.

Yet even as the high-stakes political drama plays out before the watchful eyes of the world, the nuts and bolts of how the alleged rigging was executed is likewise worthy of investigation.

The European Union has already rejected the results of the elections and is set to impose sanctions. Steffen Seibert, German Federal Government’s Press and Information Officer, declared that the minimum standards for democratic elections were not observed during the vote and believes the claims of the opposition about election fraud.

The Belarus election fraud debacle throws into sharp focus the inherent vulnerability of hand-counted elections to manipulation and the damage it brings to the integrity of the whole electoral process. Add this to the fact that manual elections are notorious for its lack of mechanisms to audit the results and you have a perfect storm for massive electoral fraud.

Ihar Barsuk, who served as a precinct election commission during the presidential election, revealed exactly how fraud was committed in his precinct. “According to my calculations, Lukashenka received about 10% of the vote. I do not remember the details but about 9-10% were stolen from opposition candidates. Just like that, in front of the entire commission and observers,” said Barsuk. Barsuk went on to say that commission members did not get to sign most of ballot papers, which raises serious questions on the chain of custody. But the major violations took place after the vote count where, according to Barsuk, his numbers “were very different to the results voiced by chairman of the commission.”

Outraged, Barsuk requested for a recount which the Commission granted. The recount revealed the discrepancy between Barsuk’s count and that of the chairman, which prompted correction of the official count. Barsuk made sure to document the attempted fraud by writing a note in the final protocol.

An election observer stationed in a Minsk precinct, Zmicier Sauka describes how the elections at his station were rigged. He claimed that 13 of the 15 observers were from the Belarusian Republican Youth Union and similar government organizations, precluding an independent observation of the proceedings.

Also, Sauka observed how he counted 710 people drop ballots in but was surprised to see the official tally at 1,046 voters, noting the difference of 336 “pseudovotes.” Worse, he noted that early voting votes for opposition candidate Karatkevich, which totaled 36, were not counted in the official tally which only reflected the in-person votes.

He believes that one person was enough to perpetuate election fraud in the precinct and laid the blame on the commission chair – the head teacher of secondary school 28 in Minsk.

The same fatal flaws of manual elections made evident in Belarus has provided the impetus for a growing number of countries to modernize their electoral processes and adopt automated election systems in one form or another. It remains to be seen how the Belarus will resolve the political upheaval. Either way, the international community is expected to put more and more pressure on the landlocked Eastern European country to fix its broken election system.

Controversial elections in Honduras leave fraud allegations, deaths and uncertainty

The Honduran presidential elections held in November 2017 resulted in a wave of protests - with more than 33 deaths -, fraud allegations and the demand of the Organization of American States (OAS) to repeat the election process.

Initial results showed Salvador Nasralla leading the vote count. The lead was substantial enough that a magistrate on the Supreme Electoral Tribunal estimated victory by Nasralla, characterizing his lead as “irreversible”. However, suspicions arose when the trend was suddenly reversed.

The observation mission of the Organization of American States (OAS) has basically declared the election to be null. To investigate what had happened, OAS commissioned a data analysis from Georgetown University professor Irfan Nooruddin. In his report, which reviewed the sudden change in the results, he states: “the difference in vote patterns between early- and late-reporting polling stations shows marked changes that raise questions as to the accuracy of the late-reported returns... The differences are too large to be generated by chance and are not easily explicable, raising doubts as to the veracity of the overall result”.

Nooruddin goes to conclude: "Based on this analysis, I would reject the premise that the National Party won the election legitimately."

Shortly after the election, a citizen movement was created through social media to call up demonstrations, not only in the capital Tegucigalpa but in different cities of the country. These protests led to violence and at least 33 deaths.

In spite of the street protest and the strong reaction of international observation missions, authorities took 21 days to declare incumbent Juan Orlando Hernández, as the winner.

The recommendations of the OAS international observers to repeat the elections were ignored. Furthermore, the Government advanced a bill to regulate information on social networks and minimize citizen mobilizations.

The political and social future of Honduras is now in the air. How will Honduras embark on new election processes after authorities refused to take into account the demands of opposition parties, election observation missions and the international community?

Learning about the Du-Vote internet voting system

Proponents of Internet-based voting systems for official government elections continue to gain support in countries all around the world. Considering that so much of our daily lives is conducted online, including online banking and secure business transactions, it only makes sense that many voters would want to have the same level of convenience and security when exercising their democratic right to vote.

When voting in person at an official polling station, voters are typically asked to authenticate their identity in some form. They are also checked against the official electoral roll of registered voters. Since this involves some necessary interaction with an election official, the public perception is that this kind of voter identification is more safe and secure. By contrast, a person who uses Internet voting can cast his or her ballot from the privacy and convenience of the home, workplace, or even from a mobile device. Who is there to verify the identity of the voter?

While the I-voting system of Estonia continues to lead the way with its infrastructure of validated citizen identification cards, a different system is being developed by researchers from the University of Birmingham in the United Kingdom. This system, dubbed Du-Vote, borrows much of its inspiration from the secure infrastructure and controls used by online banking.

One of the major concerns cited by critics and detractors of Internet voting is that election officials have no real way of validating the hardware on which the voter casts his or her ballot. This is stark contrast to the level of control an electoral commission would have over the development, deployment and use of electronic voting machines at traditional polling places. The machines belong to (or are being rented by) the electoral officials. With Internet voting, the citizen casts his or her ballot from a personal device, like a computer, tablet or possibly even a smartphone.

The Du-Vote system overcomes this concern by using independent hardware devices that are then connected to the end user's computer. Lead researcher Professor Mark Ryan explains that the system uses a “credit card-sized device similar to those used in online banking... you receive a code on the device and type it back into the computer.”

How is this advantageous? The credit card-sized device is fully controlled and vetted by election officials. It is made to be as secure, private and confidential as possible, just like with online banking. The security device is independent, so even if the home or work computer of the voter has been compromised with viruses and other security threats, the legitimacy and integrity of the security device is maintained. And because the security device is so much more specific in its purpose, it is far less susceptible to being compromised.

Many people may be concerned about the security of Internet-based voting and these issues are clearly worthy of debate. Even so, online voting could have the somewhat paradoxical effect of better securing elections than their more traditional paradigms and, at the same time, it could help to encourage greater voter turnout too.

The Du-Vote system has only been under development for two-and-a-half years and the researchers say they need further testing before the system can be suitably deployed. Current estimates are that it may be ready in time for the 2025 general election in the United Kingdom. That's in line with the more optimistic view of SRI International senior computer scientist Jeremy Epstein. He states that secure e-voting is at least 10 years away, but his more conservative estimate is more like 20 to 30 years. He calls for two-factor authentication, for instance, among other concerns.

More on the Du-Vote system will be presented next month at the 28th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium in Verona, Italy.

Poorly implemented e-voting systems should not deter advancement

A couple is walking down the street, looking for a place to have dinner. They spot a rather dodgy-looking Japanese restaurant that happens to have a terrific special on sushi. Despite some hesitation, the couple decides to eat there. The food isn't good. The service isn't good. And one of them gets horribly sick afterwards. Given this experience, would it be fair for this couple to swear off of sushi entirely for the rest of their lives? Or was this experience only indicative of the poor quality of fish and food handling at this specific restaurant?

You might be wondering why a hypothetical story about a man and a woman eating dinner at a Japanese restaurant is appearing on a blog that discusses electronic voting technologies and innovations around the world. It is because many “experts” and “analysts” are just as quick to jump to these sorts of conclusions in regards to e-voting and i-voting technology based on isolated incidents. A negative e-voting experience in one jurisdiction should not lead to the absolute dismissal of e-voting in its entirety.

As with any developing or even established technologies, e-voting is certainly not without its challenges. Issues have arisen in Ireland and Canada, for instance. In the instance of Brockton, Ontario in Canada, there have been reports of voter fraud. However, many of these problems could have been prevented and mitigated if the proper precautionary steps were taken beforehand. And even if they were not, these incidents can serve as lessons for the future implementation of e-voting and i-voting technology in other elections around the globe.

There are many factors that come into play when implementing an e-voting system and governments are advised to follow the E-Voting Readiness Index proposed by Robert Krimmer and Ronald Schuster of the Competence Center for E-voting and Participation in Vienna, Austria. There need to be systems and infrastructure in place to best handle a suitable and reliable e-voting dynamic as part of a major election.

Indeed, a robust and properly supported e-voting infrastructure is ultimately more reliable and more secure than its analog counterparts. However, an e-voting system that has not been properly audited throughout the process and one where vendors have not been suitably vetted and tested can lead to many problems. Governments should only work with reputable vendors with proven track records, ones that have clearly demonstrated their ability to run secure, reliable, accurate and transparent elections elsewhere.

To uphold the integrity of the democratic process, several criteria for choosing e-voting technology and e-voting vendors must be followed. A wise and informed decision must be made based on accessibility and transparency, for instance, in addition to cost-efficiency and accuracy. In an effort to stay within budget, some jurisdictions may opt for less-tested vendors and solutions, but this can prove to be more costly in the long run and it can result in errors and issues. A proven vendor with a proven solution can help to instil greater confidence in e-voting among the voting population and this can help to encourage further development in improving the system.

It begins with the administration and ensuring that the electoral process itself is a debate that is suitably addressed among government officials. The decision cannot and should not be taken lightly. And this is why conferences like EVOTE 2014 in Austria are so valuable, as it facilitates the open discussion among international governments regarding how best to implement what electronic voting technology in their own elections. By leveraging their combined expertise, fewer problems will be experienced by all and the number of poorly implemented e-voting systems will fall to the wayside in favor of more robust, reliable and secure technologies.

The problems with e-mail voting

Most discussions surrounding how elections can and should be run generally focus on the core group of people who will make the trip to a polling place in order to cast their ballot. This makes a lot of sense, since the vast majority of voters in elections all around the world will place their vote in this manner, whether it is through a manual system or with electronic voting.

A smaller demographic would be made up of absentee ballots. These may be people who live in remote or rural areas and they cannot or wish not to make the journey to the closest polling station, which could be a considerable distance away. And then there is the other cohort of voters who are not physically present in the region or country itself, but these expatriates and citizens working abroad have just as much of a right to have their voice heard (though an official vote) as those who are physically present.

To address this growing demographic, the Election Commission in India has submitted its recommendations to the country's Supreme Court to facilitate remote voting by Non-Resident Indians (NRIs). While there are considerations for casting a ballot through proxies or through electronic voting machines, another proposal calls for email-based ballots that the NRIs can send directly to the Election Commission. 

From a convenience standpoint, this may appear to be a sound proposal. Under an existing ordinance, non-residents could vote, but they would still need to register and come back to a local polling station. However, many NRIs “cannot afford to travel, or they only come once in many years,” according to petitioner Dr. Shamsheer Vayalil. Email can provide near instant communication and it is already a technology familiar with the grand majority of users globally. 

However, email-based voting presents multiple problems that may be difficult to overcome. First, emails inherently carry a significant security risk, as the messages can be intercepted and mailboxes can be hacked. Second, the identity of the voter cannot be suitably verified as there are no existing measures to guarantee the correct person is casting the vote. The email account can be compromised and even if it isn't, the email address can be easily spoofed by those wishing to commit election fraud. Third, it can be difficult to maintain the level of privacy and confidentiality required of an official ballot. Fourth, as the ballot is sent directly by the voter himself or herself, the sanctity of the secret ballot is compromised without further measures being taken to protect it.

Voting by email has its merits, but these challenges are too overwhelming to make the system viable for most intents and purposes. There are suitable alternatives that present their own set of challenges. The 2014 Brazilian general election saw the ambitious deployment of over 900 voting machines to nearly 100 countries around the world. The electoral court oversaw the process of preparing, sealing, shipping and deploying these electronic voting machines. A similar strategy was utilized by the Philippines with precinct count optical scan machines in major international locations. 

The cost and logistics involved with deploying electronic voting machines globally can be significant and this is another reason why turning to an existing infrastructure, like the Internet, must be explored. To this end, while email-based voting might not be the best idea, it may be possible to use far more secure protocols that are specifically designed for the purpose of casting, recording, and securely transmitting a ballot over the web to the appropriate officials. A vote through a secure website or with a secure application may work far better, so long as the protocols are in place to verify the identity of the voter, maintain the secrecy of the ballot, and securely transmit that information.