Russian security fights off attacks on e-voting system

Source: rediff.com

Just as there are countless advantages to e-voting technology, those opposed to it are quick to point out some of the problems or flaws of various electronic voting systems. One of the most common concerns, has to do with privacy and security.

However, if electoral commissions, government organizations and private suppliers take the appropriate precautions, it becomes highly unlikely that the ballots and the overall results of any election would be compromised due to outsiders “hacking” into the system and manipulating the results. Indeed, the most recent parliamentary and presidential elections in Russia serve as an example of how preparation can prevent and avert such attacks.

According to the Central Election Committee in Russia, some 1,800 hacking attempts were made on its website. All of these attacks were suitably repelled and the integrity of the elections were kept intact.

There may have been some concerns about an attack coming from within Moscow or some other part of Russia itself, but a greater concern was expressed by the Central Election Committee about hacking and manipulation coming from outside sources. As such, the CEC has made the formal decision that it will further bolster security on its website and throughout its network, particularly when it comes to the software that is used with the state automated electronic vote-counting system. There are risks, to be sure, and these must be addressed.

“We cannot afford to permit Russia's elections to be remotely controlled,” said CEC Chairman Vladimir Churov.

With the current system, the vote-counting system operates within the confines of a local network. However, the software requires access to the Internet in order to function and this can represent a security risk, even if the vote-counting system is not directly linked to other networks open to the general public. With error accumulation, the system could be “prone to remote control from outside the country.”

Russia has been using an IT system of vote counting for its elections since 1995 and this system has been fundamentally upgraded since that time. Today, it comprises over 3,000 IT facilities across Russia. Satellite and digital communication channels are readily utilized and officials work to keep these channels as secure as possible.

That being said, Russia is attempting to provide some level of transparency in an effort to aid the perceived integrity of its elections. For example, elections in Crimea and Sevastopol will be open to foreign monitoring. This does open Russia to the world in a way counter to the perception of a closed-off Kremlin.

While not commenting directly on the e-voting system being utilized in Russia itself, Dr. William J. Kelleher does note that electronic and online voting “can be both secure and confidential.” He also states that, “Without insider information, up-to-date professional security systems are nearly impossible to break into.”

The next major Election Day in Russia is scheduled for September 14.

A serious look at audits of e-voting equipment

Source: Google Images

Citizens want to believe that the practices in place for electing officials into government office are fair and true. After all, what is the point of having a democracy if a voting system can be easily tampered and hacked by outside forces, completely skewing the results of elections? To this end, the Presidential Commission on Election Administration recently recommended in its January 2014 report that “audits of voting equipment must be conducted after each election, as part of a comprehensive audit program, and that data concerning machine performance must be publicly disclosed in a common data format.”

As more and more jurisdictions begin to adopt electronic voting machines, particularly direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting machines that may or may not have a voter-verifiable paper trail for audits, it is becoming a big concern for those seeking more transparency in election administration. The audit trail for the ballots themselves is of great importance, as it provides a means of checking election results in the case of a recount, but there's more to this conundrum.

Indeed, we've seen how electoral audits in the United States are good, but they're not perfect. The Presidential Commission on Election Administration particularly encourages the use of post-election audits to check on the performance of voting technology. The Commission recommends that the election administrations in the various districts audit the voting machines after each election to “ensure both that the vote totals match the votes cast and that any problems related to machinery are reported and resolved.” However, this may be only part of the solution.

If a problem with the voting machines was discovered during the post-election audit, what could they do to rectify the situation? If the security of the voting infrastructure was compromised, what can do then? Instead, a better approach would be the inclusion of pre-electoral audits to ensure the performance and security of the voting apparatus. This way, as post-election audits can detect fraud after it has already happened, pre-election audits can prevent them from happening in the first place.

This approach is gaining steam around the world. Venezuela, a nation that has automated its entire electoral process, took this exact approach, performing a robust set of pre-election audits leading up to the actual voting day. The audits inspected the voting machine during its configuration phase, for instance, as well as the e-voting software, the electoral infrastructure, the biometric authentication system used to verify the identity of voters, the data transmission network, the tallying of the ballots, and the closure of the election, among other aspects. This comprehensive check throughout the election stages helped to provide the transparency citizens need.

The US Presidential Commission did not go into that level of detail with its recommendation, but it does indicate the importance of performing different types of audits for different functions. It endorses the need to audit the ballots cast to ensure the correct result is reported, but also the importance of auditing the performance of the voting technology itself.

The results of the pre- and post-election audits must also be publicized and open to public scrutiny. This would allow other jurisdictions to learn from the problems experienced by other districts, encouraging a more secure, more reliable, more problem-free and more robust voting system for all.