Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 2026 general election offered an unusually vivid demonstration of both what election technology can deliver and how quickly political narratives around it can shift.
For the first time, BiH deployed biometric voter identification, ballot scanners and rapid electronic transmission of results nationwide. Voting remained paper-based: voters marked physical ballots and inserted them into optical scanners. After polls closed, scanner results were transmitted electronically before the legally required manual count, with procedures in place to compare electronic and manual results and address discrepancies.
The speed of reporting demonstrated one of the most visible benefits of the new system. Polling stations were scheduled to close at 7 p.m., and by 8:38 p.m. the Central Election Commission was already publishing preliminary results for major races. Independent observers reported that electronic transmission occurred before manual counting at 98.4% of the polling stations they monitored.
That performance aligned with the stated objectives of the technology. Before the election, the European Union and BiH’s Central Election Commission said it was intended to reduce opportunities for electoral manipulation while accelerating the reporting of results. Pod Lupom, the country’s leading citizen election observation coalition, subsequently concluded that Election Day was successful and that biometric identification and ballot scanning significantly improved the integrity of the process.
Yet before Election Day, the technology had become a political flashpoint.
SNSD leader Milorad Dodik repeatedly attacked the new system. In August, he spoke of “technology, manipulation and rewriting the will of the people,” alleged fraud and predicted that the system would collapse on October 4. After voting on Election Day, he said the electoral process had been “stolen” from Republika Srpska and criticized the procurement of the new equipment.
Several hours later, the rhetoric changed.
As preliminary results showed strong performances by SNSD candidates, Dodik declared a “great victory” and described Election Day as successful.
That contrast illustrates a challenge that extends far beyond Bosnia and Herzegovina. Narratives about election technology are not always driven by how the technology performs. They can also shift with political incentives and electoral outcomes.
The deployment was not without technical issues. Pod Lupom reported incidents involving voter identification devices at 14% of monitored polling stations and ballot scanners at 21.3%. Crucially, however, those issues did not prevent continued use of the technologies. Electronic transmission occurred before manual counting at 98.4% of monitored polling stations, while scanners successfully produced consolidated results reports at 99.2%.
In other words, the devices remained in use across virtually all monitored polling stations, and the system delivered the rapid flow of preliminary results it was designed to provide.
Bosnia’s paper-based architecture provided an additional safeguard. Voters cast physical ballots, manual counts remained part of the process, and discrepancies between manual and electronic results could trigger further verification. Technology accelerated reporting without eliminating the independent physical record of voter intent.
The broader lesson is not that technology can eliminate political controversy. It cannot. What it can do is strengthen electoral integrity, make certain forms of manipulation more difficult, improve verification and deliver results faster. What it cannot do is prevent political actors from turning the technology itself into a campaign issue.
Bosnia provides a striking example. The same technology described before the election as fraudulent and headed for collapse became, within hours, part of an Election Day that the same political leader called successful once preliminary results favored his party. The predicted collapse did not occur.
For election authorities confronting disinformation, the lesson is practical. They cannot eliminate political polarization, but they can build systems capable of withstanding it through clear rules, transparent testing, independent observation, contingency procedures, auditable paper records, verification mechanisms and rapid publication of reliable information.
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s experience matters not because every device operated without interruption, but because the system made manipulation harder, problems visible, recovery possible and results verifiable.
That is ultimately a much harder narrative to overturn.
For the first time, BiH deployed biometric voter identification, ballot scanners and rapid electronic transmission of results nationwide. Voting remained paper-based: voters marked physical ballots and inserted them into optical scanners. After polls closed, scanner results were transmitted electronically before the legally required manual count, with procedures in place to compare electronic and manual results and address discrepancies.
The speed of reporting demonstrated one of the most visible benefits of the new system. Polling stations were scheduled to close at 7 p.m., and by 8:38 p.m. the Central Election Commission was already publishing preliminary results for major races. Independent observers reported that electronic transmission occurred before manual counting at 98.4% of the polling stations they monitored.
That performance aligned with the stated objectives of the technology. Before the election, the European Union and BiH’s Central Election Commission said it was intended to reduce opportunities for electoral manipulation while accelerating the reporting of results. Pod Lupom, the country’s leading citizen election observation coalition, subsequently concluded that Election Day was successful and that biometric identification and ballot scanning significantly improved the integrity of the process.
Yet before Election Day, the technology had become a political flashpoint.
SNSD leader Milorad Dodik repeatedly attacked the new system. In August, he spoke of “technology, manipulation and rewriting the will of the people,” alleged fraud and predicted that the system would collapse on October 4. After voting on Election Day, he said the electoral process had been “stolen” from Republika Srpska and criticized the procurement of the new equipment.
Several hours later, the rhetoric changed.
As preliminary results showed strong performances by SNSD candidates, Dodik declared a “great victory” and described Election Day as successful.
That contrast illustrates a challenge that extends far beyond Bosnia and Herzegovina. Narratives about election technology are not always driven by how the technology performs. They can also shift with political incentives and electoral outcomes.
The deployment was not without technical issues. Pod Lupom reported incidents involving voter identification devices at 14% of monitored polling stations and ballot scanners at 21.3%. Crucially, however, those issues did not prevent continued use of the technologies. Electronic transmission occurred before manual counting at 98.4% of monitored polling stations, while scanners successfully produced consolidated results reports at 99.2%.
In other words, the devices remained in use across virtually all monitored polling stations, and the system delivered the rapid flow of preliminary results it was designed to provide.
Bosnia’s paper-based architecture provided an additional safeguard. Voters cast physical ballots, manual counts remained part of the process, and discrepancies between manual and electronic results could trigger further verification. Technology accelerated reporting without eliminating the independent physical record of voter intent.
The broader lesson is not that technology can eliminate political controversy. It cannot. What it can do is strengthen electoral integrity, make certain forms of manipulation more difficult, improve verification and deliver results faster. What it cannot do is prevent political actors from turning the technology itself into a campaign issue.
Bosnia provides a striking example. The same technology described before the election as fraudulent and headed for collapse became, within hours, part of an Election Day that the same political leader called successful once preliminary results favored his party. The predicted collapse did not occur.
For election authorities confronting disinformation, the lesson is practical. They cannot eliminate political polarization, but they can build systems capable of withstanding it through clear rules, transparent testing, independent observation, contingency procedures, auditable paper records, verification mechanisms and rapid publication of reliable information.
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s experience matters not because every device operated without interruption, but because the system made manipulation harder, problems visible, recovery possible and results verifiable.
That is ultimately a much harder narrative to overturn.
