How Technology Reshaped Malawi's 2025 Election

 

 

Malawi's 2025 General Election offers a high-impact lesson for election managers: technology creates real value when it is treated as part of an institution's everyday operating capacity, not as a standalone innovation.

A Post-Election Review prepared for the Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC) with the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) found that integrated digital systems strengthened operational efficiency, data integrity and electoral service delivery across the electoral cycle. The review was commissioned by MEC and drew on stakeholder consultations across the country. MEC has also published an overview of the post-election review process here.

The review concludes: "The successful integration of digital systems demonstrated the Commission's growing institutional capacity to modernize electoral management while strengthening operational efficiency, data integrity and service delivery." (Post-Election Review, p. 77)

In 2025, digital tools moved beyond isolated use cases to become an integral part of electoral administration. That progress reflected MEC's ownership and operation of the technology, supported by the staff, procedures, communications and infrastructure required to make it work in a high-stakes national election.

In the review's words: "Technology was no longer deployed as a series of isolated innovations but had become an integral component of electoral administration across multiple stages of the electoral cycle." (Post-Election Review, p. 77)

Technology across the electoral cycle

The deployment included 6,500 Election Management Devices (EMDs) and 15,200 Biometric Voter Verification Devices (BVVDs).

The EMDs supported voter registration and transfers, register verification, candidate nominations, and results management, reducing manual processes and improving the management of electoral data.

At polling stations, BVVDs supported voter identification and verification. The review records that approximately 85 percent of voters were biometrically verified on election day. Stakeholder feedback in the report associates biometric verification with stronger safeguards against impersonation and manipulation, and greater transparency in the voting process.

Stakeholders reported: "The BVVD increased transparency and public trust by preventing impersonation and manipulation." (Post-Election Review, p. 78)

These are important outcomes, but they should not be read as a claim that technology alone creates confidence. The lesson is more practical: technology strengthens confidence when it supports clear procedures, is used competently by election staff, and is understood by voters, political actors and observers.

Visibility at every stage of results processing

The review also highlights the results-management process, which digitized, transmitted and tabulated results from constituency tally centers to the national tally center. A digital results pipeline is not only a matter of speed; it makes the process more visible, traceable and manageable when results are under intense public scrutiny.

Stakeholder comments recorded in the review indicate that the speed and visibility of this digital process contributed to an orderly conclusion of results processing. That does not remove the need for transparent legal procedures, auditable records and clear public communication. Rather, it shows how well-integrated systems can reinforce those safeguards at a moment when trust matters most.

Analysts have since linked that same clarity to a broader democratic outcome: a decisive, quickly confirmed result allowed President Chakwera to concede early, which eased pressure on the judiciary and lowered the risk of post-election disputes (Chatham House).

The stakeholder feedback is explicit: "The speed and visibility of this digital pipeline contributed heavily to an undisputed, orderly conclusion of the results processing phase." (Post-Election Review, pp. 78-79)

Institutional capacity is the real enabler

Malawi's experience points to a broader principle for electoral authorities globally: the success of election technology depends on the institution around it.

The Post-Election Review notes that MEC was able to own and operate the technology directly, a result of effective training and knowledge transfer during deployment. Sustainable systems depend on this kind of institutional readiness: trained staff, documented processes, local operational knowledge, and contingency plans that work under pressure.

The review also identifies areas for continued improvement, including transparent technology governance, clearer legal and operational frameworks, comprehensive testing, hands-on training, proactive public communication and resilient arrangements for connectivity and power.

The review cautions: "Successful technology adoption depends not only on technical functionality but equally on stakeholder confidence in how technology is governed, managed and communicated." (Post-Election Review, p. 78)

Those recommendations are not an approval of technology per se. They are a roadmap for making it more reliable, understandable and trusted.

A lesson for future elections

The most useful takeaway from Malawi is not that any single device or platform is a solution in itself. It is that digital electoral systems are most effective when embedded in capable institutions and supported by rigorous planning.

Technology can improve efficiency, protect data integrity and enhance electoral service delivery. But its legitimacy ultimately rests on transparent governance, human capability and the confidence of the people it serves.

The review remains a consultative document reflecting stakeholder perspectives and observer evidence; it is not a final MEC reform program or an institutional endorsement by MEC, UNDP or any observer organization.

Balancing Security, Transparency, and Efficiency: The Belgian E-Voting Blueprint

The electronic voting system being used in Flanders is emerging as one of Europe’s enduring and most thoughtfully designed ventures in digital democracy. Over three election cycles, 2012, 2018, and 2024, Flanders has developed and refined an offline voting system that balances technological efficiency with the bedrock principles of security and transparency. The model proves digitalization, when properly governed, can strengthen public trust.

According to a paper presented by election technologist Jan Coudron at the recent E-Vote ID Conference in France, the system is built on the idea of verifiable paper trail, which anchors every digital ballot in a physical record.

After voters make their selection on the touchscreen, the machine prints a paper ballot showing both the readable choices and a QR code that encodes the same information. The voter can then visually confirm their vote before depositing the printout into a sealed ballot box. This ensures that each electronic vote has a tangible, auditable counterpart—bridging the gap between digital efficiency and paper-based trust.

History

Belgium’s foray into e-voting began in the early 1990s with the Digivote and Jites systems, which relied on magnetic cards. While these early efforts demonstrated technical potential, concerns about transparency, auditability, and long-term reliability soon surfaced.

In response, a 2007 study called BeVoting, authored by a consortium of seven Belgian universities—redefined the nation’s approach around three core principles: verifiability, security, and offline operation.

By 2012, Flanders rolled out the “enhanced paper voting” system, combining touchscreen convenience with a voter-verifiable paper trail. Over the next decade, the model steadily expanded. By 2024, it covered about 62% of Flemish voters across 159 municipalities—transforming what began as a limited pilot into a core feature of regional democracy.

Firm legal foundations

The Flemish model is grounded on a robust legal and institutional framework. Two decrees—the Local and Provincial Electoral Decree (2011) and the Digital Electoral Decree (2012)—establish strict rules for system design, data management, and verification procedures. Oversight is vested in an independent College of Experts appointed by the Flemish Parliament, complemented by certified evaluators who audit hardware and software integrity before and after each election.

The Flemish platform operates entirely offline. Votes are recorded locally, printed on paper, and stored both digitally and physically. Encrypted data copies are saved on multiple USB drives, while every stage—from system setup to result transmission—is sealed, hashed, and logged for verification. This “island architecture” drastically reduces cyberattack surfaces while maintaining the speed and reliability expected from digital processes.

Early learnings

The 2012 rollout surfaced several lessons: compressed preparation timelines, uneven staff training, and interface issues like accidental double taps. However, subsequent evaluations in 2018 and 2024 recorded marked improvement. Manuals were rewritten in clearer, visual formats; polling officers received better training; and the interface was redesigned for clarity and accessibility. By 2024, 94% of municipal coordinators reported satisfaction with the system, praising its stability, accuracy, and ease of use.

Tangible improvements

Electronic voting has transformed election logistics in Flanders. Where manual counting once consumed days, complete municipal results now arrive within hours. In the 2024 elections, polls closed at 3 p.m., and full results were ready by 7 p.m. The system also reduced manpower requirements by an estimated 10,000 staff compared with manual counting. Yet the emphasis on transparency never diminished—each digital tally remains verifiable against its corresponding paper ballot, ensuring that efficiency does not come at the cost of trust.

Ensuring long-term gains

With the current equipment contracts expiring in 2027, Flanders now faces critical policy decisions: whether to upgrade, extend, or transition to new platforms. Considerations include system cost, accessibility for voters with disabilities, sustainability of hardware, and potential integration with national digital identity programs. Whatever direction policymakers choose, maintaining the delicate balance among security, transparency, and efficiency will remain the touchstone of the next phase.

Flanders’ offline e-voting model demonstrates that democratic innovation is not defined by speed or modernity alone—it is defined by verifiable trust. By keeping the process auditable, offline, and under independent oversight, Belgium has shown that technology can reinforce rather than compromise electoral integrity.

The Flemish experience stands as a measured, mature blueprint for resilient digital democracy.

When Theater Replaces Real Transparency: A Global Lesson in Election Governance

Transparency is a universally venerated pillar of electoral integrity. But when it becomes more about optics than being authentic, more performance than principle, it courts a backfire. Rather than building trust, performative transparency creates a false sense of oversight, lulling citizens into complacency, and conceals institutional rot.

In the Philippines, the chairman of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) is under fire for a procurement process riddled with controversy—making it a powerful case study in electoral governance. 

Chairman George Garcia. Source: Wikipedia/Comelec

The Philippine Case: What Went Wrong?

In a bid to create a perception of transparency, Chairman George Garcia orchestrated livestreams and media briefings covering its procurement of a new election system for the 2025 polls. But lawmakers and election watchdogs quickly saw through the performance and flagged irregularities in the procurement process.

Concerned groups raised alarms over the $310 million contract being awarded to newcomer Miru without competitive bidding. Beyond allegations of corruption, Miru’s technological failures have repeatedly disrupted elections and eroded public trust.

Even during the bidding process, Miru’s technology performed poorly in two different countries. In the Democratic Republic of Congo’s 2023 presidential elections, 45% of polling stations using Miru equipment experienced major malfunctions. The Carter Center flagged critical flaws in the voter registration kits, including thermal printers that smudged voter cards. In Iraq, Miru’s systems failed during both the 2018 and 2023 elections—70% of voting centers using its devices malfunctioned during special voting in 2023, requiring emergency manual counting.

Garcia’s efforts at transparency seemed to serve more as misdirection from the anomalies than genuine institutional accountability. As dissenting voices were ignored, public trust plummeted. Out of the camera view of the stage-managed transparency, a growing suspicion of corruption festered.

The chairman now faces multiple formal complaints which include a graft complaint alleging 61 million counts of cyberfraud during the 2025 elections, a graft suit by a congressman, accusing Garcia of violating procurement laws in awarding the $310 million contract to Miru Systems, and a disbarment petition before the Supreme Court citing a ₱300 million bribery allegation and political favoritism.

These cases point to a troubling reality: when transparency is only performed rather than practiced, accountability is undermined. 

Cameroon: Fake Observers, Fabricated Legitimacy

Lip-service legitimacy is being observed elsewhere around the world too. In Cameroon’s 2018 presidential election, the government boasted of international observers from Transparency International. But there was a catch—they never came. The illusion was only exposed after the narrative had circulated widely, reinforcing distrust in state-led transparency initiatives. 

Political Finance in France and Spain: Legal Compliance, Minimal Disclosure

While many EU member states claim to uphold financial transparency in politics, only 7 out of 27 countries mandate full pre-election disclosure of private donors. Nations like France and Spain still allow anonymity, even under mounting international scrutiny. This selective opacity chips away at the credibility of transparency efforts, revealing how compliance can mask concealment. 

The High Cost of Illusion

When institutions focus on looking transparent—through press conferences, staged demos, and curated narratives—they often distract from real structural flaws. This performative transparency misleads the public into believing systems are secure and fair, even when serious gaps remain.
 

According to research from the Electoral Integrity Project, countries with low authentic transparency suffer from lower voter turnout, increased corruption, and waning democratic trust.

True transparency isn't about putting on a show—it’s about structural openness, real-time accountability, and meaningful engagement with public concerns. Genuine transparency means conducting free, fair and competitive bidding, releasing full vendor evaluations and not just summaries and polished press briefings. It includes involving independent experts, civil society, and watchdog groups rather than staging tightly controlled stakeholder panels.

Real transparency also requires commissioning third-party technical audits instead of relying solely on internal demonstrations. It responds to legal complaints directly and substantively, rather than brushing them off as partisan attacks. In contrast, performative transparency is all optics, offering the appearance of openness without the substance.

Transparency must be more than a spectacle. In an age where disinformation, political apathy, and democratic backsliding are on the rise, authentic transparency is essential—not optional. It requires courage, institutional reform, and a commitment to face uncomfortable truths. Without it, democracy becomes less a system of accountability and more stagecraft.

And once trust is lost, no amount of theater can restore it.

Bulgaria’s “Paper Coalition” and the Politics of Distrust in Voting Machines

 

In a new article published in the Swiss Political Science Review, political scientist Petar Bankov dissects one of Bulgaria’s most heated political debates of recent years: the fight over electronic voting machines. His analysis makes a striking claim—resistance to voting technology in Bulgaria was less about technical flaws and more about politics, identity, and power.

Bulgaria first introduced electronic voting machines to reduce the country’s chronic problems of spoiled ballots, vote-buying, and administrative chaos. Observers, including the OSCE, noted clear benefits: far fewer invalid votes, faster and more accurate preferential vote counting, and stronger safeguards against the kind of clientelism that had long plagued Bulgarian elections. For reform-minded parties—especially We Continue the Change (PP) and Democratic Bulgaria (DB)—machine voting, as they call the process of using electronic voting machines, was a symbol of modernization and part of a broader digitalization agenda that included efforts to build an Estonian-style e-government.

But these benefits came with political costs for some of the country’s older, more established parties. Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB), the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS)—long dominant players with deep offline networks—saw their ability to mobilize voters and exercise influence shrink.

Their base was less digitally savvy, and their campaign methods relied heavily on offline structures, local patronage, and in some cases practices that electronic voting made harder to sustain.

In late 2022, GERB, BSP, and DPS came together to reintroduce paper ballots alongside machines, forming what their opponents quickly branded the “paper coalition.” Reformist members of parliament mocked the alliance as clinging to paper like a lifeline, while commentators noted how the phrase instantly resonated with the public. The label highlighted what was really at stake: not the technical merits of voting machines, but the survival strategies of parties tied to the old political order.

Political scientist Bankov shows how the “paper coalition” justified its position with stories about distrust and disenfranchisement. BSP argued that machine voting discouraged elderly voters from participating. GERB and DPS suggested that the technology was vulnerable and unsafe, despite the lack of evidence. These claims—often misleading, sometimes outright disinformation—were repeated in parliament, in press conferences, and across sympathetic media.

The irony, as Bankov notes, is that these arguments ignored the evidence. Surveys showed most Bulgarians supported machine voting. Statistics confirmed that invalid ballots had plummeted when machines were used exclusively. Even BSP’s claims about alienated older voters rang hollow, since many were already adept with ATMs and messaging apps. Yet the paper coalition succeeded. By December 2022, the Bulgarian parliament had passed reforms that drastically reduced the role of electronic voting, limiting the machines to producing paper slips that then had to be counted manually, eliminating their key advantages for accuracy and security.

What does this episode tell us? According to Bankov, the fight over voting machines in Bulgaria was never a purely technical debate about electoral efficiency. It was a battle over political identity and survival. Parties with little digital presence and offline mobilization strategies resisted a reform that undercut their traditional advantages. To do so, they deployed narratives—anchored in distrust, conspiracy, and nostalgia—that overshadowed empirical evidence of the machines’ benefits.

In short, Bulgaria’s “paper coalition” shows how electoral modernization can be trumped not by technology’s limits, but by political calculation. When digital reforms threaten entrenched interests, disinformation and fear can be powerful tools to roll them back—even at the expense of a fairer and more reliable vote.

Iraq's Election Integrity in Question After Widespread Technology Failures

Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) is struggling to tabulate election results after a major technology failure during the special voting phase of the Provincial Council Elections held on December 16.

The Alliance of Networks and National Organizations for Monitoring Elections (ANNOME), a local institution overseeing the election reported that electronic counting devices failed to transmit results in 70% of voting stations.

The issue forced the IHEC to manually count and sort ballots after transferring the ballot boxes to central audit centers in the governorates. Meanwhile, officials are urging the public to maintain peace and patience as they work diligently to sort and confirm the election results.

Miru Systems, the technology provider headquartered in South Korea, admitted to the glitches affecting the election's integrity. In an email communication with Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission, the company stated, “Our company would like to show that there was a technical defect in sending a number of special voting stations.”

ANNOME also reported that the region of Kurdistan experienced one of the highest malfunction rates where more than 75% of the electronic devices failed. The problem was not isolated there; it also spread to other regions including Wasit, Maysan, Kirkuk, Nineveh, Baghdad, and Sulaymaniyah.

Sajjad Salem, a member of the Iraqi Parliament, revealed that warnings about the electronic devices' functionality had already surfaced in the months leading up to the election, specifically since the previous September. The election commission dismissed the warnings and assured that those glitches had been resolved.

Miru Systems faced similar problems in Iraq five years ago when authorities had to annul votes from 1,000 polling stations in 2018.

This election chaos highlights an urgent need for stringent oversight and failsafe procedures to safeguard the electoral integrity in Iraq's democratic process. The election is scheduled to resume on Monday, December 18.

Only two e-voting companies pass Upguard cybersecurity test

 

A recent study by cybersecurity consulting firm Upguard has revealed that only two e-voting technology companies have cleared its security test. In an article posted on its website, the global company details how it selected 6 of the biggest names in e-voting and ranked them according to their CSR (cybersecurity rating).

This Upguard study is important in shedding light into the state of cybersecurity in the e-voting industry. It should raise red flags, and spur election authorities into paying more serious attention to the cybersecurity posture of their vendors.

The study gave London-based Smartmatic the highest score with an 808 CSR out of a possible 950, making it the only one in the sample to earn the rating of Good. The rest either received a rating of Warning or Average.

“Relatively speaking, Smartmatic’s security posture is decent,” the article said. The article cites some issues with Smartmatic’s website that the company needs to remedy. Namely: disabled HTTP Strict Transport Security, lack of secure cookies, and disabled DMARC.

Coming in second with 561 CRS is ClearBallot which was rated Average. It was cited for its “semi-bolstered website perimeter security posture” but was cautioned about common flaws such as lack of SSL, HTTP Strict Transport Security, DMARC and DNSSEC that “plague its web presence.”

The rest of the companies received a rating of Warning, with OSET Foundation scoring 390, Dominion Voting 342, Unisys Voting Solutions 219. Bringing up the rear was ES&S with a dismal 143 CSR, which the study attributed to “a myriad of perimeter security flaws, saying “For example, lack of sitewide SSL render its website vulnerable to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, while the exposure of ports typically assigned to file sharing services and database communications give attackers additional potential attack vectors. A lack of DMARC and DNSSEC also contribute to ES&S' low score.”

While public is not normally interested in cybersecurity as it relates to e-voting, this discovery should change that, and should prompt heightened vigilance in ensuring that all e-voting systems are designed with security in mind.

Strong authentication and authorization mechanisms; use of encryption to protect data in transit and at rest; incorporation of regular security audits and testing to identify and address vulnerabilities; and rigorous independent testing and certification to ensure their security and reliability. All these practices should be baked into every e-voting system.

Belying fraud allegations: Court upholds Angola polls, African Union lauds successful vote

In a deathblow to the 2022 aspirations of the Angola’s opposition, the Constitutional Court of Angola junked the electoral protest lodged by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), declaring the case to be bereft of merit.

The decision upheld the win of the MPLA (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola), which had dominated the African country’s political landscape for nearly five decades. It also handed President Joao Lourenco a second term.

UNITA leader Adalberto Costa Junior had cried foul over alleged discrepancies between the count of the National Electoral Commission (NEC) and his party's own tally. The poll body, on the other hand, had mightily defended the process to be fair and transparent.

UNITA claims that its parallel count shows it edging MPLA with the most razor-thin of margins — 49.5% vs 48.2%. A parallel count by civic movement Mudei indeed mirrors UNITA’s numbers.

In the face of the final and unappealable decision, UNITA and other opposition parties have called for peaceful demonstrations against so-called irregularities.

The biggest red flag seems to be the poll body’s failure to release results sheets from individual polling stations as they did in 2017, denying UNITAS the opportunity to compare it with parallel counts. Angola’s NEC only published aggregated results from 19 provinces. Exacerbating the bad optics is the fact that the CNE is largely MPLA-controlled, and that four out of the sixteen commissioners have repudiated the results.

The opposition also decries the lack of election observers, where only 1,300 were present to cover a country twice as big France, and questions why MPLA was given more airtime than others.

Yet even as the controversy hogged the headlines, analysts largely view the allegations as a fly in the ointment in an otherwise successful election. This, as election observers led by the influential African Union (AU), have cited the largely peaceful conduct of the polls.

AU Chairman Moussa Faki Mahamat had lauded the exercise as an important milestone in the history of Angola, saying that "once again, the people of Angola have demonstrated their resolve for continuous search for democratic and participatory governance in their country.”

The chairperson went on to congratulate Angolans for turning out in droves to exercise their democratic right to choose their leaders, commend he smooth conduct of the polls, and praise the everyone involved for conducting themselves peacefully throughout the electoral process.

Mahamat has also urged Angolans to continue committing to peace and democracy, appealing for a peaceful and lawful resolution to all election disputes.

Presidential candidate in Brazil to seek own voting system audit

In the feverish run up to the Brazilian elections in October, President Jair Bolsonaro is seeking an audit of the voting system, a move that comes after the embattled leader had relentlessly questioned the credibility of the country’s voting systems.

“As allowed by electoral law, we will hire a company to do the audit,” Bolsonaro said.

“People want transparent elections in which the vote is effectively counted for their candidate.”

The president’s sweeping claims had been met with backlash, the most furious of which had come from Brazil’s Supreme Electoral Court judges who had flatly refuted Bolsonaro’s allegations and categorically declaring that Brazil’s electoral system is free of fraud.

Luis Barroso, president of Brazil’s Supreme Electoral Court, once fired back at Bolsonaro saying “threatening the realization of an election represents anti-democratic behavior. Polluting the public debate with disinformation, lies, hatred and conspiracy theories represents anti-democratic behavior.”

Surprisingly, Bolsonaro appears to have made a fatal misstep as a recent Genial/Quaest opinion survey shows that his bombastic attacks on the voting system is turning off moderate voters. Furthermore, despite the vitriol spewed against the voting system, trust of electronic voting machines among Brazilians has increased to 22% of the electorate from a low of 27% in September, the survey revealed.

More alarmingly for Bolsonaro, the poll also showed that voter support for him dipped after three months of gains against former Lula.

The survey indicated that if the elections were held in April, Lula would have won 46% of the votes against 29% for Bolsonaro. Lula is on track to reaching 50% of the votes and winning the election right in the first round, according to the survey. In case the contest goes to a second-round runoff, the survey said that Lula would defeat Bolsonaro by 54% versus 34%.

"Voters believe the president is wrong to confront the Supreme Court, to question the credibility of electronic voting machines," said survey director Felipe Nunes.

Moderate voters are the swing votes that could be key to winning the election because most supporters of Bolsonaro or Lula have already decided who they will vote for.

Philippine poll body opens 2022 e-Voting source code for review, NGO lauds positive effect on transparency

 The Commission on Election (Comelec), the body overseeing elections in the Philippines, has recently announced that it was opening to public scrutiny the source code of the e-Voting system for use in the 2022 elections. In an advisory, the Comelec has called on stakeholders to participate in the review.

The move has drawn the praise of advocacy group Democracy Watch which has applauded the initiative of the Commission on Elections’ (Comelec) as a step towards increased transparency.

In a statement, the group’s convenor Paco Pangalangan said that Democracy Watch recognizes the Comelec’s continued commitment to transparency and “lauds its latest initiative to engaging citizen groups in the Local Source Code Review of the Automated Elections System (AES).”

Democracy Watch sees the opening of the source code for review as increasing the credibility of the automated system among Filipino voters. It cites a survey it commissioned showing the automated elections have been well-received among Filipinos in the past.

Conducted by Pulse Asia after the 2019 midterm elections, the survey found that 87% of Filipinos said that they were satisfied with the automated polling system. The results also showed that 94% of respondents stated that they approved of the ease of use of VCMs and that 91% expressed that they would like to see automated voting continue in future elections.

“Building off of these findings, this Source Code Review is a crucial endeavor that can only increase transparency and reliability of AES as we approach the 2022 National and Local Elections. By reviewing the source code, participating citizens’ groups can help ensure that votes are accurately counted when Filipinos go to the polls next year,” the statement said.

The intensive software audit which will be conducted for seven months is pursuant to the nation’s Election Automation Law and has been held every election cycle since the country shifted to e-Voting in 2010. 

Among the stakeholders invited to participate in the local source review are political parties, legitimate IT groups, and civil society groups known for their election reform advocacies.

Democracy Watch, a citizen-led democratic initiative that envisions a mature, reformed and a truly democratic political system for the Philippines, has urged concerned groups to take part in the review and submit soonest their applications to be participants.

“We call on these parties to exercise their right to participate in democracy and to fulfill their responsibility in holding government institutions accountable. Let us work hand in hand with the COMELEC for a free, fair, safe, and credible automated elections in 2022,” Pangalangan said.

The Philippines is slated to hold a general election next May where more than 18,000 positions are to be filled up including those of the president, vice president, senators, and congressional representatives.